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Abstract
More than 80 central banks use a committee to take monetary policy decisions. The composition
of the committee and the structure of the meeting can affect the quality of the decision making. In
this paper we review economic, experimental, sociological and psychological studies to identify
criteria for the optimal institutional setting of a monetary committee. These include the optimal
size of the committee, measures to encourage independent thinking, a relatively informal structure
of the meeting, and abilities to identify and evaluate individual members’ performances. Using
these criteria, we evaluate the composition and operation of monetary policy committees in
various central banks. Our ﬁndings indicate that e.g. the monetary policy committee of the Bank
of England follows committee best-practice, while the committee structure of other major central
banks could be improved.
JEL classiﬁcation: C92, D70, E58
Bank classiﬁcation: Central bank research; Monetary policy framework
Résumé
Dans plus de 80 banques centrales, les décisions relatives à la politique monétaire sont prises en
comité. Or, la composition de ce dernier et la structure de ses réunions peuvent inﬂuer sur la
qualité du processus décisionnel. Au terme d’une analyse des études économiques,
expérimentales, sociologiques et psychologiques consacrées à la question, nous déﬁnissons les
critères qui caractérisent le cadre institutionnel optimal d’un comité de politique monétaire : taille
idéale; mesures favorisant l’indépendance des points de vue; structure relativement informelle des
réunions; et moyens de distinguer et d’évaluer les contributions individuelles des membres. À
partir de ces critères, nous comparons la composition et le fonctionnement des comités de
politique monétaire de plusieurs banques centrales. Nous en concluons que les pratiques suivies
par la Banque d’Angleterre sont supérieures à celles de plusieurs autres grandes banques
centrales, qui gagneraient à améliorer la structure de leurs comités.
Classiﬁcation JEL : C92, D70, E58
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Recherches menées par les banques centrales; Cadre de la politique
monétaire1 Introduction
In recent decades, central banks have undergone substantial transformations.
One of the elements of the ‘quiet revolution’ (Blinder 2004) in central bank-
ing has been a change in the way monetary policy decisions are taken: the
‘dictatorial central bank governor’ of the past has increasingly been replaced
by committees taking monetary policy decisions. Today more than 80 cen-
tral banks take monetary policy decisions in a committee, and no country has
ever replaced a monetary committee by a single decision-maker (Mahadeva and
Sterne, 2000). Committee decision-making in central banks mimics a trend set
elsewhere: juries, not individual jurors, must decide guilt or innocence; parlia-
ment, not individual lawmakers, must decide upon bills; and medical operations
of members of the Royal family or Presidents are typically not carried out by a
single doctor, but by a team.
We view the structure of the monetary policy committee as an important
part of the overall institutional framework of the central bank. The structure
and composition of a committee can aﬀect the outcome of the meeting and,
possibly, the quality of decisions. Improvements to the decision-making process
can have similar eﬀects as making a central bank more transparent, as both can
make monetary policy more predictable. Consequently, following best-practices
in setting a framework for monetary policy decisions can result in an environ-
ment where inﬂation expectations are better anchored or anchored at lower
levels.1 Against this backdrop, we review empirical and experimental studies in
the ﬁelds of economics, psychology and sociology to identify recommendations
for setting up a committee ‘optimally’. Our focus lies on issues relevant for
monetary policymaking in central banks, but clearly this discussion applies for
other types of committees as well. This complements the work of Fujiki (2005),
who provides a selective review of theoretical models, and the studies by Sibert
(2006) and Vandenbussche (2006). In addition, we provide detailed data on the
setup of monetary committees in central banks.2 Using these criteria we then
analyse the institutional setup of monetary policy committees in various central
banks in the world.
To preview the conclusions, we ﬁnd that some central banks have taken mea-
sures to potentially increase the eﬀectiveness of their monetary committees. A
vast majority of central banks, however, could probably improve their commit-
1Chortareas et al. (2001) ﬁnd that higher transparency is correlated with lower inﬂation.
2This extends the work of Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and Wyplosz et al. (2003).
1tee framework, by e.g. making it possible to identify and evaluate individual
contributions to counter free-riding on information provided by others.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we outline the main beneﬁts
and ‘costs’ of taking monetary decisions by committee. We identify a number
of criteria for ‘good’ committees, and use them to evaluate real-life monetary
committees in section 3. The ﬁnal section summarises our main conclusions.
2 The impact of committees on decision-making
Consider a central bank with a clear target and instruments suitable to achieve
the target. Also, the central bank is independent in its use of instruments, i.e.
eﬀectively shielded from outside pressure.3 As it is impossible to foresee all con-
tingencies, the central bank retains a degree of discretion (otherwise monetary
policy could be set by a computer). The central bank’s success will depend on
the quality of its decisions. And if these decisions are taken by a committee,
the structure of the committee will matter.
My experience as a member of the FOMC left me with a strong
feeling that the theoretical ﬁction that monetary policy is made by
a single individual ... misses something important. In my view,
monetary theorists should start paying attention to the nature of
decision making by committee...’ (Blinder, 1998, p. 22).
We deﬁne the monetary policy committee as the body taking monetary
decisions.4 Ideally, we can think of the monetary policy committee as a group
of people sharing information and taking a decision together, on the basis of the
information reviewed (and revealed).
Assume that all committee members genuinely want the committee to take
good decisions, i.e. to take socially optimal decisions. However, the committee
operates in a uncertain environment, as e.g. the state of nature or the state of the
economy is not readily observable. Hence, committee members need to gather,
share and discuss information, on which the group decision will be based. Figure
1 shows how a group decision is taken. On the right we show how at each of these
3In the words of Goodfriend (2005) assume that an ‘overarching guideance’ exists that
supplements formal central bank independence and that enables the central bank to use its
monetary policy power eﬃciently to stabilize the economy.
4When referring to the body taking monetary policy decisions we use the terms ‘monetary
(policy) committee’, ‘committee’ or ‘group’ interchangeably. The discussion will primarily












Figure 1: Decision making and potential pitfalls
stages group processes might interfere in the decision-making process. Examples
of such processes include adoption of extreme preferences (polarization), the
need to achieve consensus, or free-riding on information provided by others
(Kerr, MacCoun and Kramer 1996). The structure of the committee can either
facilitate taking good decisions, e.g. by providing incentives to be well-prepared
– or induce frictions, because e.g. the committee is too large to allow for a
genuine exchange of views.
To expose the main elements of group decision-making more clearly, we ab-
stract from strategic considerations or analysing the merits of diﬀerent decision
rules.5 This allows us to focus on our main objective, namely analysing how
individuals behave when taking a decision together.
2.1 The beneﬁts of committee decision-making
The virtues of committees can be summarised as follows: ﬁrst, if every member
of a committee exerts eﬀort to become informed, committees can gather more
information than individual decision-makers. Better information can lead to
5An extensive overview is given in Mueller (2003).
3better decisions. Second, even if all committee members have identical infor-
mation, they need not reach the same (individual) conclusion. This is because
committee members typically have diﬀerent skills, diﬀerent backgrounds and
preferences, diﬀerent abilities to process data and to extract useful information.
Third, if information may contain errors, a committee can pool signals and re-
duce uncertainty. Fourth, committees provide an ‘insurance’ against extreme
preferences.
Information gathering Committee members can possess diﬀerent informa-
tion sets. Central bankers might e.g. have links to key sectors in the business
community (Goodfriend 2005) or to international fora, from which they gain
private information. This holds in particular if banks have regional branches.
Also, within a central bank, committee members might have diﬀerent functions,
e.g. one being in charge of (domestic) research, one in charge of ﬁnancial su-
pervision etc. Group discussion enables participants to share information, such
that the committee as a whole can access a larger pool of information than any
one person acting alone (Shaw 1981).
Information processing Individuals diﬀer in terms of their ability to pro-
cess information. Homo economicus is an eﬃcient calculating machine, homo
sapiens is not (Blinder 2006). Diverse groups can outperform individuals or
homogeneous groups in solving problems (Hong and Page 2004).6 Surowiecki
(2004) provides an example of a weight-judging competition, where members of
a crowd placed wagers on the weight of an ox. The average guess of 787 con-
testants was 1,197 pounds. Impossible as such a guess might seem, the crowd
was essentially correct: the actual weight of the ox was 1,198 pounds. Blinder
and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli et al. (2002) show that groups outperform
individuals in an experiment designed to mimic monetary policy when the state
of the economy is uncertain.
Applied to monetary committees, variations in information-processing skills
can result, for example, from employing diﬀerent economic models to evalu-
ate the state of the economy, or from diﬀerent methods for making forecasts
(Gerlach-Kristen 2006). Pooling knowledge leads to better forecasts and poten-
tially better decisions.
6Odean (1998) cautions on the value of ‘expert knowledge’ when experts are individuals.
He reports that physicians, nurses, lawyers, engineers, entrepreneurs, and investment bankers
typically overestimate their own knowledge. However, the average prediction of experts – i.e.
if their knowledge is pooled together – is likely to be correct (Surowiecki 2004).
4Removing noise from signals Consider the following stylised setting (Sibert
2006): A committee of n members has to take a binary decision. Prior to the
meeting, every committee members receives a private signal about which alter-
native is best. Suppose that by assumption the private signals are uncorrelated,
informative, but ‘noisy’ – i.e. although the signals are on average more likely to
be correct than incorrect, there is a certain probability that the signal is wrong.
Assuming that all members vote according to the signal they receive, and that
decisions are taken by simple majority, the probability that the correct alter-
native is chosen goes to one, as the committee size increases. This result is the
famous Condorcet jury theorem (1785): If decisions are taken by majority, the
committee is more likely to pick the best option than any of its members (i.e.
a committee is more than just the sum of its parts). Lastly, in an experimen-
tal study, Kocher and Sutter (2005) show that groups are not smarter decision
makers per se, but that they learn faster than individuals.
Insurance Much as a careful investor would not put all his eggs in one bas-
ket, having policy set by a group rather than by a single central banker keeps
policy from going to extremes (Waller 2000). Hence, committees can provide
an ‘insurance’ against strong individual preferences. Also, letting a committee
decide – as opposed to having a single monetary decision maker – provides a
certain ‘protection’ for the Governor (and all other committee members), who
otherwise might be subject to substantial personal pressure (Goodhart 2000).
This ‘protection’ helps to promote independence and facilitates frank discussion
of opinions.
Implications An important implication of the ﬁrst two elements is that to
reap the full beneﬁts of committee decision-making, its members should be
heterogeneous. An optimal committee consists of people that share information
to jointly maximise the information available to the group.
Some qualiﬁcations apply: ﬁrst, information gathering and information pro-
cessing is assumed to be costless (and eﬀortless). Hence, the optimal committee
would be inﬁnitively large. As we show below, once we allow for costs associated
with information gathering, there is likely to be an ‘upper limit’ for the optimal
committee size.
Second, the insurance argument assumes that individual preferences are sta-
ble, and that group membership does not introduce biases in judgment. This,
however, is not the reality. The next section shows that there are powerful rea-
5sons to believe that committee membership may aﬀect individual preferences or
judgment.
2.2 The costs of committee decision-making
1 Large committees do not work
Output of real world committees is not always as good as one might expect,
given the capabilities of the individuals who comprise them. This holds in
particular for large committees. The key diﬀerence between individual and
group decision making is the exchange of information. However, information
exchange in group decision making is often done poorly (Stasser 1992). For
instance, when information acquisition is costly, group members have incentives
to free-ride. An appropriate committee structure, however, may alleviate these
issues.
Free-riding Free-riding or shirking refers to behaviour where individuals do
not exert their full eﬀort in contributing to the group’s performance. Shirking
can most easily be measured in simple additive tasks, such as pulling a rope.7
Assuming that there are no co-ordination problems and that individuals’ eﬀort
does not depend on the size of the group, group output should rise linearly
as additional group members are added. However, if individuals tend to shirk
when they are part of a group (and more so the larger the group), then group
performance will be a concave function of the number of members. A vast
number of studies have found evidence for shirking across a range of additive
tasks such as clapping and shouting (Sibert 2006).
In a committee context, shirking exists because revealed information be-
comes a public good. Suppose the correct decision depends on the (unobserv-
able) state of the economy. A member observes a signal if he expends eﬀort
(the signal is a random draw from a normal distribution with known variance).
There is no conﬂict over objectives, but information is a public good, which is
costly to obtain (such ‘costs’ can include reading brieﬁng material distributed
prior to the meeting). Hence, each member would prefer to become informed
rather than have the committee be completely uninformed; however, each mem-
ber’s most preferred option is for the other members to expend eﬀort becoming
7An additive task is one wherein the group’s performance is the sum of individual perfor-
mances. A disjunctive task is one wherein the committee’s performance depends on its most



















































Benefits Costs when votes are not published Costs when votes are published
Optimal size when 
contributions can be identified
Marginal gains from  information 
gathering or processing
Marginal costs due to 
shirking
Optimal size when contributions 
cannot be identified
Figure 2: Optimal committee size
informed, while he free rides (Sibert 2005).
Shirking becomes more important as committee size increases: the larger the
group, the less noticeable it is if one member does not suﬃciently participate
in the decision-making or if he is poorly informed. Hence, if the size of the
committee increases, the (marginal) costs arising from shirking increase. At
the same time, the additional beneﬁts from more people being able to process
information are getting smaller, the larger the committee (see graph 2).
There are two ways of dealing with shirking.
• Limiting the size of the committee.
• Creating incentives to discourage shirking.
Shirking is reduced when individual contributions can be identiﬁed and eval-
uated. For instance, relay team swimmers swim laps faster when individual
times were made public, but slower when they were not (Williams, Nida, Baca
and Latan´ e 1989). Similar results are found for brainstorming tasks (Harkins
and Jackson 1985). Croson and Marks (1998) experimentally examine how in-
formation aﬀects behaviour. All group members can contribute towards a public
good, but participants receive varying amounts of information about contribu-
tions made by others (the public good can be compared to information in a com-
mittee context). Revealing anonymous information about other contributions
7leads to a signiﬁcant decrease in contributions. When individual contributions
are clearly identiﬁable, average contributions increase.8
Applied to the central banking context, an institutional device to discourage
free-riding is the publication of the discussion in the form of minutes. An alter-
native possibility could be that prior to the meeting, each committee member
privately notes his preferences and the main arguments for the upcoming deci-
sion. This forces individuals to become informed. Again this information could
be published in the minutes.
Inertia A common criticism of committee decision-making focuses on the dif-
ﬁculties to reach a decision:
‘Had Newton served on more faculty committees at Cambridge, his
ﬁrst law of motion might have read: A decision-making body at rest
or in motion tends to stay at rest or in motion in the same direction
unless acted upon by an outside force’ (Blinder 1998).
Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2006) formalise this notion. They show that if
the status quo is the ‘default option’ in situations where the committee cannot
agree, monetary policy tends to be too inertial. However, these authors require
a number of strong assumptions to generate inertia, such as that the committee
is not able to take a majority decision (there is an even number of committee
members). In practice, many central banks (such as the ECB) have provisions
that in the event of a tie, the Governor’s vote counts double. Also experimental
evidence indicates that groups are not more inertial than individuals (Blinder
and Morgan, 2005).
An important factor contributing to inertia is if committees are not ‘inter-
nally transparent’. By this we mean that not every committee member is forced
to reveal his position (i.e. whether he votes A or B). Such ambiguities can
result in consensus-oriented committees. Also voting committees need only to
convince fewer members to change policy (at the margin ‘50 + ’ percent is
suﬃcient), whereas consensus-oriented committees need to convince more than
50 percent of the group members. Simulations show that building consensus
can delay the decision making (Gerlach-Kristen 2005). We return to this issue
when we discuss consensus versus voting in committees.
8A study that comes relatively close to monetary policy analysis is Henningsen, Cruz, Miller
(2000): 189 persons worked either alone or in 4-person or 8-person groups. Each participant
was asked to read information for the purpose of making a future individual or group decision.
Individuals who anticipated working alone recalled more of what they had read.
8Optimal committee size As the optimal committee size depends on be-
havioural considerations, purely theoretical studies (e.g. Fujiki, 2005) cannot
provide a deﬁnite answer. The experimental literature does give some guidance:
Slater (1958) had 24 groups of 2-7 male undergrads who were given analytical
problems to discuss. He asked the group members whether their group was too
large or too small. Groups of ﬁve did best.
Oakley et al. (2004) ﬁnd that with only two people on a team, there may
not be a suﬃcient variety of ideas, skills, and approaches to problem solving for
the full beneﬁts of group work to be realized. Also, conﬂict resolution can be
problematic in a pair: whether right or wrong, the dominant partner will win
most arguments. On the other hand, if a team has more than ﬁve members,
at least one is likely to be relatively passive. As monetary policy is a relatively
complex, disjunctive task, the beneﬁts from having a large committee might
be very important. Hence, the optimal committee size might be moderately
larger than these studies suggest. Sibert (2006) concludes that monetary policy
committees should probably have at least ﬁve members, but they should not
be much larger. Beyond seven to nine members, the participation of members
decrease and members become less satisﬁed, and groups of over twelve people
ﬁnd mutual interaction diﬃcult.9
‘Hub-and-spoke’ committees and rotation The monetary policymaking
bodies of the central banks representing the two largest currency areas in the
world – the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank – have clearly
more than 10 members.10 They are also set up in ‘hubs’ (i.e. the FED Board
in Washington and the ECB in Frankfurt) and ‘spokes’ (the regional FEDs or
the national central banks of the euro area members countries).
• The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) comprises the seven Board
members and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Of
the other eleven regional FED Presidents only four have the right to vote.
9As an aside, the literature on microbanking also suggests that small group sizes (3-10
people) work best, e.g. because small groups can monitor each others’ eﬀort better (Morduch
1999).
10In their defense, it has been noted that for a large currency area, the committee might
beneﬁt from regional representation: ‘If an economy is complex... then it might be useful to
have the views of the key sectors represented on the policy committee’ (Goodfriend 2005).
From a practical perspective, improvements in data collection and better economic statistics
may reduce the need for regional or sectoral representation. For the euro area national rep-
resentation might also be an important issue, e.g. because it may facilitate communication
(Wellink et al., 2002).
9• The ECB Governing Council consists of ﬁve ECB Board members, plus
all euro area National Central Bank Governors (currently 12).
Both central banks have adopted a rotation system to limit the number of
voting members – i.e. the right to vote rotates following a pre-determined se-
quence.11 An implicit understanding of this system is that non-voting members
hardly ever participate in the discussion.
In principle, rotation is a useful device to increase the amount of information
without compromising on the group size. Note, however, that a potential danger
of such a system is that if committee members interests’ are not fully aligned,
voting members might exploit the non-voting members. Bosman et al. (2004)
show that committee members might be trapped in a ‘prisonner’s dilemma’, i.e.
everyone votes for options that maximize his or her own advantage. Such indi-
vidualistic voting behavior can result in the committee taking worse decisions
than if every member had just voted for the option that maximises the group’s
beneﬁt.
2 Instability of preferences and groupthink
An important assumption underlying committee beneﬁts is that membership
in a group does not change members’ prior beliefs or preferences. Economists
typically downplay the inﬂuence of others on our preferences, and emphasize
people’s autonomy. In contrast, sociologists and social-network theorists de-
scribe people as embedded in particular social contexts. Inﬂuence from others
is inescapable. The more inﬂuence members of a group exert on each other,
the more likely it is that group members’ preferences align (Surowiecki 2004).
Research in social and cognitive psychology has devoted considerable eﬀort to
showing that human judgment is imperfect (Kerr et al. 1996).
Are committees any less – or more – subject to judgmental biases than indi-
vidual decision-makers? Several hundred studies demonstrate that belonging to
a committee polarizes its members. For example, groups are more likely to sup-
port failing projects (Whyte 1993). This could imply that monetary policy set
by a committee is overly biased against inﬂationary pressures, or less likely to
correct past mistakes (note that in this case the failure to correct past mistakes
is not due to inertia, but to biased, polarised views).
11The ECB rotation scheme will become eﬀective once new member countries beyond the
current 12 introduce the euro. Details are given in European Central Bank (2003).
10A particularly harmful form of group polarization occurs when committee
members stop paying suﬃcient attention to alternatives, because they are striv-
ing for consensus. This is also called groupthink (Janis 1973). The following
factors have been identiﬁed as leading to groupthink (Sibert 2006):
• Insulation from outsiders;
• Lack of diversity in viewpoints;
• Leaders actively advocating solutions.
Key to avoiding groupthink is independence, i.e. to encourage committee
members to think for themselves. Encouraging independence has two positive
eﬀects (Surowiecki 2004): ﬁrst, it avoids errors in judgment becoming corre-
lated.12 Second, independent committee members are more likely to gather
new, additional information or interpret existing information diﬀerently. This
might lead them to question the group consensus and thus, ultimately, limit
groupthink (Morck 2004).
An institutional arrangement to avoid groupthink is to appoint committee
members with diﬀerent personal backgrounds. Clearly, members of a mone-
tary committee should have some knowledge about what monetary policy can
achieve. However, a committee consisting of only economists (possibly with
degrees from a small handful of universities, which aligns their way of thinking
even more) or only central bankers is more likely to exhibit groupthink than
a more diverse group. Similarly, having external members on the committee
– i.e. members not working at the central bank, like academics or business
representatives – might help.
Note, however, two caveats: First, if group members are ‘too independent’,
the monetary committee may run the danger of speaking with too many voices
when communicating externally. The monetary committee should be individ-
ualistic enough to reap the beneﬁts of diversity, yet collegial and disciplined
enough to project a clear and transparent message. Second, while diversity is
likely to have a positive impact on group processes, it may be detrimental for the
conduct of monetary policy, if the composition of the group impedes the central
12Errors in individual judgment do not wreck the collective judgment, as long as these errors
are not systematically correlated (i.e. all pointing in the same direction). Note, however,
that the collective decision might be biased if the signals are correlated, e.g. because all
committee members base their judgment on the same forecast. This underlines the importance
of independent information gathering.
11bank’s independence. Such a situation can occur when a monetary commit-
tee is dominated by government oﬃcials, who may care about their re-election.
This bears the risk that despite the central bank being formally independent,
its policy nevertheless reﬂects electoral constraints.
3 How the meeting should be structured
Avoiding information cascades A diﬀerent institutional device to counter
groupthink is related to how meetings are structured. Assume a committee
taking a binary decision (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992). Prior
to the meeting, each member receives an independent signal. The chairman
makes the ﬁrst proposal. If the ﬁrst person after the chairman has received a
similar signal, he will support him. If not, he might ﬂip a coin. The important
issue is that if the second person chooses to support the proposal, the third
person has strong incentives to agree to the proposal, too: even if he received
a diﬀerent signal prior to the meeting, having observed (on the basis of their
voting behaviour) that the ﬁrst two persons have both received the other signal,
it is safer to assume that his own signal is wrong. Similar considerations hold,
of course, for all other committee members.
In other words: the ‘hurdles’ to expressing a contrary view increase as more
members have previously voiced identical opinions. Such a group process is
called an ‘information cascade’. In an experimental setup, Anderson and Holt
(1997) show that wrong initial signals can start a chain of incorrect decisions that
is not broken by correct signals received later. Repeated information cascades
can lead to groupthink. Milgram (1974) shows that individuals may have an
innate psychological predisposition to obey authority. If the chairman (or the
person to speak ﬁrst) is a very powerful or ‘authoritarian’ person, the tendency
for conformity may be even higher. In another experiment Milgram et al. (1969)
put a single person on a street corner and had him look up at an empty sky for
sixty seconds. Of the passing pedestrians, only a tiny fraction stopped. When
the psychologists put ﬁve skyward-looking men on the corner, four times as
many people stopped to gaze at the empty sky. When the authors put ﬁfteen
men on the corner, 45 percent of all passers-by stopped. Applied to committee
decisions, this experiment illustrates that it can be very diﬃcult to withdraw
from a consensus, once it has gained suﬃcient momentum (i.e. support from
other group members).
The fundamental problem with information cascades is that choices are made
12sequentially, instead of all at once. There are two ways to avoid information
cascades: ﬁrst, to promote independent thinking among committee members.
Independence can be promoted by not making the meeting structure too formal.
For instance, it is preferable that not the same person always gets to open the
discussion, or that the same person always makes the interest rate proposal. A
device to implement this is not to have a ﬁxed order for speakers. Alternatively,
one might consider removing the sequential element of the decision-making by
letting all people decide simultaneously. One way of doing this is to vote.
Consensus or voting? A long-standing debate among central bankers is
whether a committee should use voting or operate consensus-based. A pri-
ori there is no reason to believe that either of the two options always delivers
better results. Voting has the advantage that every group member has to reveal
its preference. Also voting can act as a device to reduce free-riding, in particular
if individual voting patterns are published. A similar arrangement can, how-
ever, be implemented in a consensus-oriented approach, when the contribution
of individual committee members is identiﬁable.
Several disadvantages of voting have been mentioned. First, members on
the losing side can become dissatisﬁed (particularly if they are regularly losing),
or ‘winning’ members can become concerned with maintaining group harmony
(Janis 1973). This could lead them not to vote sincerely. Second, if individual
voting patterns are published, external pressure on committee members might
increase.13 Lastly, group members might be concerned about appearing ‘com-
petent’. This might discourage asking questions challenging the conventional
wisdom. This needs to be taken seriously, as e.g. the study of Schweiger et
al. (1986) shows that ‘dialectical inquiry’ and playing the ‘devil’s advocate’
can greatly improve the decision.14 Hence, it is important that the discussion
is frank and open. This concern could be dealt with by publishing a detailed
transcript of the discussion, but not mentioning names.
How well consensus-oriented committees perform depends on whether the
committee is evidence-based or verdict-based (Surowiecki 2004): Evidence-based
juries spend time to sift through the evidence and explicitly contemplate alterna-
13This concern has been particularly emphasised in the European context, where National
Central Bank Governors might be subject to political pressure in their home country (Issing
1999). Another concern about publication of votes is that market participants might use them
to predict individual members’ voting patterns.
14In their purest forms dialectial inquiry uses debates between diametric sets of recom-
mendations and assumptions, whereas devil’s advocacy relies on critiques of single sets of
recommentations and assumptions (Schweiger, Sandberg and Ragan 1986).
13tive explanations before they take a vote. Verdict-based juries see their mission
as reaching a decision as quickly as possible by taking a vote before any discus-
sion (and the debate concentrates on getting those who do not agree to agree). If
evidence-based, the consensus-oriented approach may encourage members more
to engage in a discussion than voting. Pressure to reach a consensus quickly, as
in verdict-based juries, often leads to poor choices (Priem et al., 1995).
Lastly, Blinder (2006) highlights the danger that voting may pose diﬃculties
for communication. Voting highlights diﬀerences in opinion, even if in practice
they are relatively small. A consensus-oriented approach may make it easier
when addressing the public: ‘If the result is a cacophony rather than clarity, that
may confuse rather than enlighten the markets and the public’ (Blinder 2006).
2.3 Implications for committee design
Committees can oﬀer the classic beneﬁt of diversiﬁcation: a higher mean with a
lower variance. To function properly, the committee should have an overarching
framework, i.e. a clearly deﬁned target and freedom to adjust its instruments
in order to achieve that goal. But additional arrangements may be required to
facilitate information sharing and aggregation, and avoid polarisation of group
members.
Table 1 summarises the main design implications of the preceding discussion.
First, the body taking monetary decisions should be small enough to allow for
an exchange of views. Second, encouraging group members to act and think
independently is crucial to avoid polarization and groupthink. Having group
members with diﬀerent personal backgrounds – i.e. diﬀerent nationalities or
diﬀerent professions – might help. Lastly, the literature oﬀers no clear preference
for voting or consensus – both can work well, provided that arrangements exist
to identify and evaluate individual contributions to avoid shirking.
3 Monetary policy committees in practice
Before we review how real-life monetary committees operate, we should stress
that committees organised very diﬀerently can nevertheless take good decisions.
Each central bank operates diﬀerently, and diﬀerent traditions may justify dif-
ferent setups. However, on the basis of the studies reviewed we would argue
that the likelihood for committees to consistently take good decisions is higher
if the setup of the committee follows the lines we outline below.
14Issue Criteria for good committees
Clear objectives and independence
* Clearly deﬁned goal and eﬃcient instruments;
* High score of central bank independence
Size of the monetary policy committee
* Not much larger than 5 members
* Rotation can lead to better information and limit the group size
Measures to avoid free-riding
* Possibility to identify and evaluate individual contributions
Polarization and groupthink
* Encouraging group members to think for themselves;
* Diﬀerent personal backgrounds
* Having a mix of internal and external members
* No ﬁxed speaking order to avoid information cascades
Table 1: Criteria for ‘good’ committees
3.1 Clear objectives and independence
Information about central banks’ objectives and their degree of independence is
published in Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and Wyplosz et al. (2003).
The results from Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) indicate that of the 94 central
banks in their sample, 77 can be classiﬁed as having instrument independence.15
79 central banks take decisions in a committee. The most common committee
size is between 5-10 members (see ﬁgure 3). 43 committees reach a decision by
consensus and 36 through formal voting (see ﬁgure 4).
Regarding the clarity of objectives, 90 had monetary stability as a legal
objective. About 95 percent of these central banks have operationalized this
objective by translating it into a deﬁnition of price stability, an inﬂation target
or a monitoring range – which is an improvement over 1990, when only 57
percent had an explicit nominal target or monitoring range.16
3.2 The structure of the monetary policy meeting
For this section we looked at speeches from senior bank oﬃcials, information
on central bank websites, and responses to a brief questionnaire we sent out to
15Their score ranges from 0 (no instrument independence) to 1 (full independence). 77 have
a score of 0.66 or more, indicating that the central bank is the ‘leading body’ to set monetary
policy. Note that the number of observations diﬀes between ﬁgure 3 and ﬁgure 4, as not all
central banks have committees or disclose their size.











5-10 members More than 10
members
Source: Mahadeva and Sterne (2000)








Source: Mahadeva and Sterne (2000)
Voting patterns published
6
Figure 4: Monetary policy decision procedures
16central banks to ﬁnd out how their committee meetings are structured. Table
2 lists key elements of monetary policy committees of selected central banks in
2006. We report the following:
• Clear objective and central bank independence (column 1 and 2) to assess
whether the committee has a clear task and instrument independence to
achieve its goals. The score for central bank independence ranks from 0
(not independent) to 1 (fully independent).17
• The size of the monetary policy committee (column 3). This allows check-
ing whether the committee is too big. Where available column 3 re-
ports the number of external and internal members in brackets (external
members are not working for central banks, internal members are central
bankers). Together with the information about personal backgrounds of
committee members given in column 4, this serves as an indication of the
diversity of the committee.
• Column 5 reports whether decisions are taken by consensus (C) or voting
(V); column 6 shows whether (individual) votes are published. This in-
formation is a proxy for the degree to which individual contributions can
be identiﬁed and evaluated – i.e. for the degree to which the committee
setup discourages shirking.
• The remaining columns summarise information on measures to counter
information cascades and groupthink. Column 7 provides information
about the organisation of the meeting, column 8 reports who makes the
interest rate proposal, and column 9 reports if the governor has been on
the losing side of a vote (the idea here is that an authoritarian governor
is never on the losing side of a vote). Lastly, column 10 provides how
committee members are encouraged to act and think independently.
It is apparent that many central banks have very diverse monetary commit-
tees, staﬀed with central bankers, academics, and representatives of the busi-
ness community or ministries (see ﬁgure 5).18 Another apparent feature is that
few central banks have ﬁxed speaking orders, but at the same time, few cen-
tral banks have institutional mechanisms to eﬀectively encourage independent
17The information in columns 1 and 2 is taken from Mahadeva and Sterne (2000), exceptions
are the target values for the Dominican Republic and Madagascar. This information has been
collected from the central banks’ websites.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Only central bankers Internal and external members
Source: Own calculations
Figure 5: Diversity in monetary committees
thinking. Moreover, most central banks have fairly strict rules on who makes
the interest rate proposal (see ﬁgure 6) – which, as indicated above, bears a se-
vere risk of information cascades. And lastly, many central banks are reluctant
to disclose whether the Governor has a lost a vote during the last ﬁve years (see
ﬁgure 7). However, some central banks provide that information, and it seems
that among these, the Governor being on the losing side of a vote is clearly the
exception.
Let us look more closely at some prominent central banks or at central banks
with interesting institutional arrangements.
• In many ways the Bank of England’s committee structure follows best-
practice: it has a clear goal, it is made up of diverse members (academics,
business representatives, and central bankers) and it is not too big. Also
individual contributions can be identiﬁed and evaluated, and its members
are encouraged to think for themselves. Lastly, the Governor lost a vote
in 2005, which indicates that he is not dominating the committee.
• The Bank of Japan is the only one to explicitly change the speaking order
for every meeting. We view this as an eﬀective measure to get informed
and to limit information cascades. With 9 members the committee is also
not too large, and every board member can make an interest rate proposal.






Governor Staff No clear rule Unknown
Source: Own calculations









Figure 7: Has the Governor lost a vote during the last ﬁve years?
23working experience as government oﬃcials or in the business community).
• The structure of the FOMC and the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank (ECB) could be improved: Individual contributions cannot
be clearly identiﬁed and both committees are probably too large. The
FOMC also lacks an explicit inﬂation target, and internal and external
transparency of the ECB is low (consensus decision-making and no publi-
cation of minutes or voting records). Moreover, it is likely that both com-
mittees were ﬁrmly led by its chairman (FOMC)19 or its Chief Economist
(ECB),20 although that might change with recent personnel changes.
On the positive side: the fact that each of the national European central
banks briefs its own Governor individually, and that each of them uses a
diﬀerent economic model, maximises the beneﬁts from information gath-
ering and processing. Similarly, the FED beneﬁts from a ‘hub-and-spoke’
structure, which facilitates gathering and processing regional information.
Also the ECB has a clear goal,21 and both ECB Governing Council and
FOMC comprise members with diverse backgrounds (all central bankers,
but with diﬀerent nationalities or with diverse past experience).
• The Bank of Canada has a clear objective, and the size of its MPC is
probably optimal. However, individual contributions are not identiﬁed,
and there are no outside members. On the positive side: although all get
the same brieﬁng material, board members also receive policy advice from
a group of senior advisors, who are encouraged to think independently.
• The Central Bank of the Czech Republic makes it possible to identify
individual contributions with a six year delay. This provides a compromise
between allowing for the evaluation of individual performance, yet shield
against external pressure.
• At the Bank of Israel, four departments have to prepare recommendations
19Alan Greenspan has chaired the FOMC for about 18 years and has never been on the
losing side of a vote. The transcript of the February 1994 FOMC meeting shows that a clear
majority of the committee favoured raising the funds rate by 50 basis points. Greenspan,
however, insisted not just on 25 basis points, but on a unanimous vote for that decision. He
got both (Blinder 2006).
20The ECB’s Chief Economist traditionally starts the debate by giving an overview of recent
economic developments. He is also the ﬁrst to make an interest rate proposal (at the end of
his exposition).
21The ECB is not an inﬂation targeter, but it has a relatively clear deﬁnition of price
stability (inﬂation ‘below, but close to 2 percent’). This is the ECB’s overriding objective.
24before the meeting independently. This forces each department to conduct
its own analysis, which counters shirking and groupthink.
• An interesting feature of the Swiss monetary committee is that diﬀerent
group members are briefed by diﬀerent departments. To some extent this
could be viewed as a device to encourage independence. However, their
speaking order is relatively ﬁxed,22 the committee has no outside members,
and there is no way to (externally) identify and evaluate individual input
for the discussion.
• The National Bank of Poland addresses information cascades by allowing
each member to make interest rate proposals. Also the Chairman has been
on the losing side of a vote on several occasions. Regarding accountability,
neither individual votes, nor minutes are published. However, plans exist
to modify the inﬂation report to make it ‘minutes-like’ (i.e. to provide a
broad picture of the discussions and enabling outsiders to identify views
of individual members).
4 Conclusions
Typically, reports released to the public to explain monetary policy decisions
feature detailed discussions about the state of the economy. While such informa-
tion is important for ﬁnancial markets, our discussion suggests that availability
of economic information alone is not suﬃcient to guarantee optimal decision-
making. Well-structured institutional arrangements can ensure that committee
members get informed and adequately process economic information, before tak-
ing a decision. Do real-life monetary committees feature such arrangements?
Our survey of the literature suggests that encouraging independent thinking
and having members with diﬀerent personal backgrounds may be useful pro-
visions to avoid groupthink. The structure of the meeting should not be too
formal (e.g. no ﬁxed speaking order) in order to reduce information cascades.
And if individual contributions can be identiﬁed and evaluated, free-riding can
be eliminated.
22After an informal debate between the members of the Board, their Deputies and
economists who prepared the documents, the Chairman of the Governing Board (who is Head
of monetary department) gives the ﬂoor to the heads of two other departments. Then he
speaks again, although it is perfectly possible for any member to intervene again after one of
his colleague has spoken. The Chairman of the Governing Board summarizes the arguments,
repeats the decision and closes the debate.
25We would like to stress that there is no ultimate model, and it is unlikely that
one structure dominates all others on all aspects. Each solution also reﬂects lo-
cal circumstances and traditions. However, our guidelines for the way monetary
policy committees should be set up show that some central banks could prob-
ably improve their committee framework. By changing the way the monetary
committee works, incentives are created for group members to actively partici-
pate in the discussion, to become informed and to reveal their information. As
this is the basis for the gains that decision-making by committee can oﬀer, hav-
ing such institutional arrangements can contribute to the overall quality of the
decisions. As this overview has shown, some central banks could reap more of
the committee beneﬁts if they had provisions to avoid free-riding or encourage
‘thinking outside the box’.
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A Appendix
The following email was sent to 149 central banks listed on the BIS website
to inquire about their committee structure. If a central bank is not listed in
the tables in the main text, it did not respond to the questionaire. In addi-
tion, we checked their websites and used personal contacts (where available) to
verify that the information provides an accurate picture of the decision-making
procedure.
Dear colleague,
I am currently investigating how central banks make monetary policy
decisions. In many central banks monetary policy decisions are not
taken by a single decision-maker, but by a committee. I am interested
in how exactly the committee reaches a decision i.e. how the committee
functions. I would also like to clarify that I am only interested
in monetary policy decisions, not other central banking matters (e.g.
payment systems).
I would kindly like to ask you the following questions:
1. How many people are directly involved in making the monetary policy
decision in your central bank? I.e. if the decision is taken
in a committee, how many members does the committee comprise?
2. Does the committee vote, or is the decision taken by consensus?
3. If the committee votes: Are votes published? Are individual
votes published?
304. Are there ways to identify individual contributions to the discussion?
5. Do all committee members share similar background (i.e. are all
central bankers), or are some of the members from the academic
world or the business community?
6. Is there a fixed speaking order in the committee (for instance:
alphabetical, or by rank), or can any person raise any issue at
any time?
7. Who makes the proposal of how interest rates should be set?
8. Does the committee release minutes?
9. Provided that the Governor is a member of the committee: has
he ever been on the losing side of a vote during the past 5 years?
10. Is individual thinking encouraged among committee members? How?
Please feel free to bring any other matters of relevance about the
functioning of the monetary committee to my attention.
Kind regards,
Philipp Maier
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